Introduction
In recent times, it has become a commonplace claim that Turkey's Islamic identity has started to play a more significant role in the self-identification and worldview of many Turkish people. This phenomenon has been particularly considered as a sign of the rise of Islamism in Turkey under Justice and Development Party (JDP) rule since 2002 . 1 This new strength of Islam has alternatively been considered as a unique product of the failure of Islamism, 2 or interestingly, as a success of Kemalism by some social scientists, 3 while others have interpreted it as a manifestation of the urgent need to reform the authoritarian Republican ideology. 4 Needless to say, Islamists, through their discursive transformation and an ad hoc advocacy of the reforms stipulated for the European Union (EU) accession process, have brought a brand new political understanding to Turkish politics. The JDP's new politics should also be regarded as the culmination of transformations in the various Islamic sectors in Turkey, from religious orders and communities to intellectuals. 5 Scholars of Islamism mostly believe that there are two phases of Turkish Islamism in the post-1980 period. The Islamism of the 1980s was characterized by an authoritarian and collective search for a new Islamic identity and a quest for an Islamic state, derived from a Jacobin understanding of state and revolution. The Islamism of the 1990s dropped its claim for an Islamic state and revolution and started to focus on individualist Islamic demands and experiences rather than collective Islamist demands. 6 This change was politically reflected by an internal critique over the experiences of the Welfare Party (WP) in the 1990s. The WP's politicization of religion is seen as one of the reasons for the eradication of Islam's social, cultural and economic influence in Turkey. Later in 2001, the establishment of the JDP and its departure from the rigid ideological framework of the National Outlook (Milli Görü ş) parties came about as a natural extension of this critique.
The paper at hand attempts to argue that since 2002, a third phase of Islamism has been taking place in Turkey. Islamists have been experiencing power, enrichment, upward class mobilization and they have pursued successful careers during the JDP governments. Opportunity spaces within the public sphere have opened up for Islamists so that they have now reached the higher echelons of bureaucracy and become owners of large companies and media groups. They are much more power and wealth oriented than ever before. Accordingly, when faced with the secularizing aspects of being powerful and rich, many Islamists have experienced the loss of a certain spiritual identity in this period. Islamist discourses often claim to offer a meaning to the lives of 'ordinary' Turkish people, by filling the ethical and ideological void generated by the radical secularist reforms of Kemalism. But today they seem to be challenged by an ethical void emanating from the effects of capitalist consumerism on the daily lives of Turkish people, including Islamists.
It is my contention in this paper that much as Islamists have been integrated into the political processes by electoral mechanisms since 1970, Kemalist securitization 7 and control over religion in the name of secularism is a significant reason for the impoverishment of the Islamist discourses. Securitization also conceals aspects of that impoverishment that stem from a position of power and consumerism within Islamism itself. The literature on the Islamic transformation in Turkey fails to recognize the impoverishing aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon an Islamist agenda while addressing economic and political opportunity structures given by international conjuncture and Kemalism (global economic interdependence, electoral politics and the EU process). In a deeper sense, Kemalism not only determines and transforms Islamist discourses in Turkey but also impoverishes them.
Towards this end, this paper has sought to address the specificities of Turkish Islamism from a historical perspective. It also focuses on the nature of the relationship between Kemalism and Islamism in Turkey and tries to show how Kemalist securitization has impoverished the content of Islamist discourses by making illegal any autonomous existence for religious groups and by making the popular Islamic identity insecure. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that mainstream Turkish Islamism has benefited much from the opportunities created by the processes of globalization and integration with the EU in the last decade. 6 Kenan Ç ayır discovers self-reflexive and confessional aspects of Islamism in the 1990s by pointing out the transition from collectivism to individualism in the Islamist movement through an analysis of Islamic novels, Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey: From Epic to Novel, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007. 7 Securitization is a development that moves a particular issue beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1998, p. 23.
Islamists have changed their views on democracy and focused on tolerance, pluralism, and the participatory aspects of democracy and civil society. The Islamic middle classes and a rising new bourgeoisie are influential actors in this transformation. Moreover, it examines the parameters of the JDP's victory over the last decade and its implications for Turkish Islamism. It unearths a somewhat unnoticed impact of the JDP rule: the impoverishment of Islamist discourses.
Turkish Islamism from a historical perspective
Islamist movements have been transforming their discourses and programmes in many parts of the Muslim world since the late 1990s. This newly emerging form of Islamism embraces a political discourse that prioritizes curtailing the role of the state. In this form, it is argued that constitutional limits to government or legal recourse prevent the state from intruding too far into social and private lives, and this is a well-established tradition in Muslim societies. This tradition is reinterpreted to accommodate universal values such as democracy, human rights and civil society. In this vein, it is suggested that the domain of the state in its reach into society should be restricted as much as possible so as to maximize social and individual choices and differences. The state should not endorse any single comprehensive doctrine. This form of Islamism also emphasizes the dialogue and interaction between Islam and the West. In a sense, Islamism has passed into 'a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is losing its political and revolutionary fervour' but is continuously infiltrating the social and cultural practices of daily life. 8 An analysis of Turkish Islamism is needed to incorporate studies on non-Western or multiple modernity approaches. 9 The contemporary rise of Islamism should not be seen as an anti-global, anti-Western defence of threatened Islamic traditional societies, but rather as a 'part of multiple modernization processes in different world regions, multiple constellations of nation-state formation and democratization as well as religious change and secularization in different civilizations in the present global era'. 10 With the urgent need for a response to the challenge of the West and the rejection of a Eurocentric definition of modernity, Islamists strive for the revitalization of Islamic civilization. The notion of Islamic civilization has constituted a useful framework for coping with the challenge of Western modernity and for the construction of a new (Islamic) modernity in order to meet the needs of a truly Islamic life in the contemporary age. Since late Ottoman times, the underlying theme inherent in Turkish Islamism has always been the 8 Nilü fer Gö le, 'Snapshots of Islamic modernities', Daedalus, 129(1), Winter 2000, p. 94. 9 The concept of multiple modernity, as developed particularly by Shmuel Eisenstadt's comparative approach to civilizations, presupposes that Western modernity is only one among other types of modernity evolving in the various civilizations of the world. It draws attention to the fact that religious and imperial traditions remain constitutive dimensions of modern societies despite various forms of secularization. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Multiple modernities', Daedalus, 129(1), Winter 2000, pp. 1-29. 10 Willfried Spohn, 'Multiple modernity, nationalism and religion: a global perspective', Current Sociology, 51(3/4), May/July 2003, p. 282.
The experience of Turkish Islamism 7 concept of an Islamic civilization which regards Turkey as the centre of the Muslim world.
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Islamism in Turkey, compared to its counterparts in the wider world of Islam has its particularities based on its specific evolution. Islamism cannot be simply confined to a movement which has a political ideology for capturing power. Any conscious epistemological and ontological reference to Islam for shaping or directing a state, a society and an individual, directly or indirectly should be regarded as Islamist.
12 One reason for this broad conceptualization of Islamism is the recognition that Islamism in the Ottoman -Turkish context has been different from the Islamism that has gained so much currency in the literature by reference to the forms of Islam found in Iran, Egypt and Pakistan. Islamists generally embrace the unity of religion and state, an idea that challenges the validity of the secular democratic nation-state in the Muslim world, and in its place offer the alternative of Sharia law. In the Turkish case, there has been no political party openly calling for Sharia law largely due to constitutional constraints. Even though the restoration of the Caliphate represents a general demand of most Islamists, 13 there has never been any Islamist party which calls for the restoration of the Caliphate in Turkey.
The aforementioned particularities of Turkish Islamism or 'Turkish exceptionalism' do not hint that Turkish Islamism is superior to other Islamist experiences in its adherence to liberal values and practices. It would be essentialist and ethnocentric to attribute pluralism, tolerance and openness merely to Turkish Islam, while regarding radicalism, violence and an inclination towards authoritarianism as belonging to other forms of Islam.
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The primary characteristic of Turkish Islamism derives from the fact that it is deep-rooted in Sufism. The Nakşibendi order has a unique position in relation to the evolution of Turkish Islamism to the extent that all of the significant groups engaged with the contemporary Islamist movement, ranging from politicians to intellectuals and businessmen, have been influenced by its teachings. 15 However, it is not the Sufi tradition itself, but the specific interaction between Sufism and the strong state tradition 16 of Turkey that has a significant impact on the 11 The JDP also uses the idea of a common, universal civilization to which Islam has contributed in order to justify Turkey's integration with the EU, see Daniella Kuzmanovic, ' It should also be noted that Turkey has never been colonized, though it fought a war of independence. Turkish Islamism has been imbued with some level of anti-Western feelings due to the memories of the 19th-century Ottoman political experience, the First World War and the War of Independence. Nevertheless, the West has not constituted, not least in part due to the Westernist reforms of the Kemalist modernization, the 'other' in the making of a Turkish identity. Leading elements of Turkish Islamism abandoned their anti-European discourses in the late 1990s and have supported Turkey's integration into Europe. Furthermore, Turkish Islamism is basically an urban movement empowered by a strong middle class with its own identity politics. 21 Islamists try to recreate modern codes of urbanity, civility and universalism, blending them with their own religious features. There is an emergence of a new Islamic bourgeoisie. The market not only secularizes Islamists, but also contributes to democratic stability and human rights in Turkey. 22 The class bases of Islamism in Turkey have been enlarged in the post-1980 period by liberal economic policies, which introduced market mechanisms, new communications technologies, the privatization process and private organs of the media. In the 1990s, Islamist individuals and bodies developed new public faces and created their alternative public spheres which ranged from radio stations and TV channels to hotels.
Altogether, as suggested earlier, one of the most striking characteristics of Turkish Islamism has been related to the nature of the relationship between Kemalism and Islam since the foundation of the Republic. Regardless of the fact that Islamists have been integrated into the political processes by electoral mechanisms since 1970, the securitizing and controlling nature of the Kemalist approach towards Islam has had an impoverishing effect on the content of Turkish Islamist discourses. The transformation and impoverishment of Islamism in Republican Turkey cannot be fully comprehended without an exclusive emphasis on the Kemalist securitization of Islam through secularism.
Kemalism and Islamism: control, securitization and the 28 February Process
Kemalism continuously instrumentalizes Islam by employing a two-sided approach. On the one hand, when it needed to cement its position and act as a mechanism of control for the unity and mobilization of Turkish society, it supported its usage in the public sphere in order to legitimize its own aims. On the other hand, it has continued to maintain that Islam is responsible for Turkey's backwardness and that it is an obstacle to reaching the level of modern civilization. 23 Stemming from this dual intertwined pattern, the principle of secularism has served both as a mechanism of state control over the religious sphere and as a discourse of securitization in Turkey. Contrary to the conventional separation of religious and political institutions, secularism is seen as the regulation and disciplining of religious life and institutions by the state through the Directorate of Religious Affairs. At the same time, it was also developed into an ideological core element of Kemalism to the extent that its preservation became identified with the defence of the Republican state and reforms. 24 This dimension is related to the politicization and securitization of Islam.
Paradoxically, secularism has not been regarded as a process to depoliticize Islam; rather it had removed Islam from its political role in the Ottoman system 21 while politicizing and enlivening it in new ways to support the Kemalist regime. Thus, there has never been a time in the republican history in which Islam was not politicized by the state though there are some differences in state policies between the single-party period (1923 -50) , the rule of the rightist parties and the period after the 1980 military coup. 25 The politicization of Islam (producing an acceptable interpretation of Islam) 26 in the hands of the state has been accompanied by a securitization of Islamic demands. The Turkish modernizing elites have often securitized any religious or ethnic claims of identity, including the Islamic one. The state is not only controlling every religious activity, ranging from its organization to its place in education but also presenting an acceptable concept of Islam as opposed to its reactionary and dangerous interpretations. Through this mechanism of control and the discourse of securitization, the state determines and shapes religious discourses in all public contexts in order to accommodate them to the 'official' interpretation of Islam. It places some limitations on autonomous religious practice as a matter of national security. 27 Hence, securitization is a key to comprehending the true nature of the relationship between Kemalism and Islamism. The Kemalist regime defines any challenge to its ideological hegemony as a security threat, thus justifying its exclusionary policies regarding identity issues. In the politics of securitization, a discourse of an unending state of emergency is used to rationalize and justify extensions to an unaccountable state power. It is basically a process of state-led securitization and the object of security is the secularity and integrity of the Republican state. 28 International events are also translated into domestic politics in order to justify the policies of Kemalist securitization. The experience of Turkish Islamism 11 to multi-party politics, the insecurity of religious orders and communities was translated into a struggle for power to assure a secure place in society. 30 The clientelist nature of the relationship between the right-wing political parties and religious groups in the 1950s and 1960s could not change the securitizing aspects of Kemalism towards Islamic demands. The emergence of the National Outlook Movement parties in Turkish politics further aggravated this politics of securitization. The last two decades have witnessed a series of events along these lines, notably the 28 February Process (a postmodern coup in 1997), the closure of the Islamist parties (the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party) and the ban on the headscarf in universities. As a reaction to the rise of Islamism in the 1990s, the Kemalist establishment triggered a process of re-securitization, called the 28 February Process 31 in order to demolish public visibility of Islam. This process made it clear that the Kemalist establishment could not allow Islamist attempts to introduce Islamic symbols and idioms to political rhetorics, which would modify the standards of legitimization for politics in Turkey. In spite of a set of radical reforms carried out in the last decade, passed to meet EU membership terms, any expression of Islamic discourse in the public realm is still an issue of securitization. In this sense, Kemalism effectively determines the contours of the Islamic political discourses in the country. It can be argued that this controlling and securitizing nature of Kemalist secularism has been influential in the making of a power-oriented Islamic movement, which shows a secondary concern for creating a new political language of Islam. This is strongly related to the continuing weakness in the intellectual roots of Islamism (in contrast to its socio-political strength) in Turkey.
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A typical example of Kemalist securitization in relation to Islam is the issue of the headscarf which has become one of the nodal points in Turkish politics. It is a master signifier that organizes all competitive symbols around the struggle of power and lifestyles between Kemalists and Islamists. 33 The headscarf acquires an aspect of religious freedom when articulated with Islamist demands and a quest for an Islamic political system when articulated with Kemalist fears. The Constitutional Court, in its decision on the closure of the Welfare Party, presented the following arguments against the headscarf: firstly, it restricts women's liberties; secondly, it is a symbol of opposition to the Republic; thirdly, it would lead to unequal treatment; and lastly, it implies the threat of the organizing of the state according to the dictates of Islam. Nevertheless, the Kemalist experience of secularism and the particularities of Turkish Islam, interacting with each other, have produced a more moderate course of Islamism and have prevented any radicalization of the Islamist movement even in times of repression. Above all, Kemalist securitization is a dynamic and complex process which has two different and interrelated aspects: the inclusion of Islamist actors for power-sharing and the exclusion of Islamist discourses. On the one hand, it integrates Islamist actors into Turkish party politics by allowing their competition for power and the expression of some modest Islamist discourses while in opposition. On the other hand, once they are in power, these Islamist actors are expected to drop their Islamist demands and discourses. Islamist figures can even lead the country whether as president or as prime minister, if they disown the Islamist discourse. Otherwise, the several disciplining and silencing mechanisms of Kemalism, including the Turkish Constitutional Court, securitize any Islamist claims for change in the secularist nature of the Republic and exclude Islamist discourses from the public arena. This dual nature of Kemalist securitization has generated rather interesting implications for Turkish Islamism. Admitting that Kemalism provides various structures of opportunities for the increasing significance and influence of Islamist political and social actors, it still insists in illegalizing any autonomous religious organization and any expression of Islamist discourses by these actors in the political arena. An important consequence of this securitization is a loss of a public negotiation between secular and Islamic discourses which might bring about a deeper exploration of the relationship between Islam and democracy.
In sum, to reduce the reason for the transformation of Turkish Islamism to the lessons learnt from the 28 February Process is to misread the dynamics and trends of Islamism in Turkey. It ignores the profound transformation of Islamist ideas about secularism, democracy and the EU through interaction with Western and Turkish secularist circles. A multi-dimensional approach should be employed to account for the political changes in Turkish Islamism, to go beyond the lessons learnt from the 28 February Process. Along these lines of analyses, both sides of the so-called change should be noted: respectively, a transformation led by the rise of the new Islamic bourgeoisie given appropriate opportunities over the last two decades and an impoverishment represented by the loss of an Islamic vocabulary and ethos amongst the Islamist circles.
Aspects of transformation in Turkish Islamism: the new Islamic middle classes and opportunities
Although the transformation of Islamists gained momentum with the recognition that there is no way out of the Kemalist impasse without further democratization The experience of Turkish Islamism 13 and Europeanization, it would be a mistake to disregard the influence of the growing demands of the Islamic middle classes (small and medium-sized enterprise holders), the moderate positions of religious groups (e.g. the Gü len Movement) and other factors such as the transformation of other societal groups including labour unions (Hak-İş, the Confederation of Righteous Trade Unions) and business associations (MÜ SI˙AD, the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), all of which have had a cumulative effect. The learning process for Islamist circles is perhaps best accomplished by the aggregation and articulation of interests among the labour and business sectors of Turkish civil society.
In the pre-1980 period, Hak-I˙ş reflected the discourse of the National Outlook to create Islamist policies on labour issues. From the mid-1980s onwards, Hak-I˙ş managed to establish itself as a national force whose significance could not be limited to Islamist demands. Hak-I˙ş was the first Islamist organization to successfully use the discourse of civil society and democracy not only to further the interests of the workers, but also to identify the problems regarding the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. 35 MUSI˙AD, as a powerful representative of the Islamic bourgeoisie, combines Islamic identity with a free market ideology and supports the exposure of the Turkish economy and society to the world. Like other sectors of the Islamist movement, it calls for the restructuring of statesociety relations in Turkey on the basis of the principles of democracy, pluralism and freedom. It also constitutes an Islamic model of modernity which presents a new synthesis of the economically rational and the morally communitarian modern self. 36 The Gü len Movement, as the leading Islamic community in Turkey, has a very special place in the transformation of Turkish Islamism. This movement draws attention to the links between Islam and modernity, and rejects the idea of an inherent clash between East and West. Although this movement suffers from residual nationalism and statism, it has opposed anti-Western feelings within Islamism by declaring that Turkey's integration into the EU would not result in a cultural assimilation for Turkish society. 37 A further observation in relation to the transformation of Islamism in Turkey is that in the post-1980 period, and especially in the 2000s, postmodernism and liberalism had a significant impact on Islamist circles. This is a new period of transformation for Turkish Islamism. One basic result of this transformation is the reaching for a post-Islamist stage where the idea of an Islamic state is left behind and the will to see Turkey as a member of the EU is welcomed by the Islamists. In fact, Europeanization has been a significant source of transformation in Turkey since the times of the Tanzimat. 38 As with the proclamation of constitutional rule in 1876, the extensive rights and liberties of the EU process have contributed to the transformation of Islamism. This time though, the transformational effects of Europe should be seen not just in the reforms of the Westernist elite but also in the changing attitudes of Islamists towards the West and themselves. Islamists have lessened their fears of being assimilated into a European secular culture in the case of integration with the EU. They have started to voice the idea that the Islamic identity is so strong that Europe could not assimilate it, even if it so aimed. Therefore, the EU accession process is desecuritized by the Islamists on the identity issues. Ex-Islamists, notably the JDP leadership, have shown great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms which have brought far-reaching changes to the Turkish political and legal system.
Parallel to the change in the discourses of Islamist intellectuals, a process of political division started within the National Outlook Movement, situated somewhere between the reformists (yenilikçiler) and traditionalists (gelenekçiler). The first group had dropped their Islamist claims and advanced a new politics, namely, a conservative democracy under Recep Tayyip Erdog an's leadership (the JDP), while the latter preferred to keep a low profile stance until the secularist campaign came to an end and they maintained their Islamist ideas (the Felicity Party, Saadet Partisi).
While transplanting themselves to the root of Turkish centre right politics and by referring to the legacies of Adnan Menderes and Turgut Ö zal, ex-Islamists of the JDP (Erdog an, Gü l and Bü lent Arınç) having their roots in the National Outlook Movement, have themselves undergone a transformation, thus making feasible an Islamic-oriented party focused on the will for integration with the EU, cooperation with the IMF, secularism and democratization. One of the trademarks of the JDP is its criticism of Islamism, and most importantly, Islam as a political ideology. It embraces pluralism, democracy, civil society, human rights and secularism. Its conception of secularism rejects the French model of an exaggerated laicism, but rather upholds the models of Anglo-Saxon countries. Essentialist and dogmatic aspects of Turkish Islamism have been erased and its pragmatic aspect has been strengthened by the JDP's new discourse on conservative democracy which attempts to achieve a compromise between Islam and democracy. 39 A major contribution that the Turkish Islamist movement seems to have gained from the JDP's experience in power is the development of a new discourse on and practice of Turkish foreign policy, which combines nationalist interests and Islamic sensitivities. The new foreign policy is largely based on a novel geographic imagination which puts an end to the alienation of Turkey's neighbours and Middle Eastern countries. It also redefines Turkey as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. 40 It is clear that this new geographic imagination, formulated by the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutog lu, underlines the necessity of developing cooperative and close relations with Islamic countries by recognizing Turkey's ties of civilization with its neighbouring regions, including the Middle East. 41 Although this imagination is beyond neo-Ottomanism and represents a continuity with Turkey's activist foreign policy in the post-cold war era, it still serves the Islamic ideals of having better relations with Muslim and Middle Eastern countries.
First and foremost, Turkish Islamists have always criticized the Westernoriented foreign policy of the Kemalist Republic, particularly in reference to its estrangement from the Middle East. The JDP's multi-dimensional foreign policy approach not only integrates Turkey into the region, but also empowers it as the prominent actor in a geography mostly populated by Muslim peoples. In addition, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's leadership and his effective diplomatic style, as exemplified in the Gaza crisis in 2008 and in Davos in 2009, addresses Islamist aspirations and expectations to the extent that he emerges as the most influential leader in the eyes of the ordinary people in the Muslim world.
Thus, the JDP experience has transformed the parameters of both Turkish politics and Islamist politics through Europeanization and the internationalization of internal issues. The JDP administration, with its religious cadres and policies, has even produced a sense of siege and insecurity amongst Kemalists. However, the trends of transformation for Islamism in Turkey are open-ended and incomplete. The success of this experience conceals the impoverishing aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon an Islamist agenda.
Aspects of impoverishment and the post-Islamist triumph in the 2000s
What is the meaning of the apparent post-Islamist triumph in the Turkey of the 2000s? It is easy to find curious examples of deep scepticism towards the JDP and its transformation in the literature. For instance, in contrast to those who view Islamism as a search for recognition of an identity, I˙brahim Kaya insists that as a consequence of the Islamization programme of the military in the post-1980 period, the Turkish political system has been colonized by Islamist groups. With the JDP government, he argues that Islamists have reached a stage where they have been developing an alternative intellectual model in order to establish their hegemony in a Gramscian sense. The rise of the JDP and Gü len Movement is described as an attempt to overcome a democratic republic with the aim of establishing an Islamic totalitarian regime. 42 Indeed, many secularists feared that the JDP would seek to undermine the foundations of Turkey's secular order if it succeeded in electing Foreign Minister Abdullah Gü l as the eleventh president of the country in 2007. These fears led to large-scale popular demonstrations, called Republic Meetings (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) by supporters of secularism in several major Turkish cities and this environment prompted the Turkish Armed Forces to issue an e-memorandum (e-muhtıra, a veiled threat of a military coup) on 27 April 2007. The protestors at these meetings called the JDP government an existential threat to the secular and nationalist nature of the Turkish state. Similarly, by drawing attention to the increasing anti-secular religious activities, the generals restated, against this challenge, their determination to protect the secular nature of the Republic.
In my own account of the above analyses, the same developments can be interpreted in a different way. Turkish politics have presented an appearance of stability since 2002. 43 It could be stated that in spite of some evidence of instability, such as the 27 April e-memorandum (e-muhtıra) and the crisis over the election of a new Turkish president in the spring of 2007, the JDP's seizure of 46 per cent of votes in the 2007 national elections and its success in electing Abdullah Gü l as the new president of the Republic enabled Turkish democracy to achieve a higher level of consolidation. Besides, the transformation of Turkish Islamism might bring reconciliation between democratically minded secularists and the religious circles. If this happens, then the securitizing structures of Kemalism will eventually lose their power and a contemporary European form of secularism will prevail in Turkey. From this perspective, the re-Islamization of Turkish politics and society would be a continuation of Turkey's integration with Europe. 44 Under the JDP administration, Turkey is not only rethinking its understanding of secularism but also reshaping its Islamic identity. This emerging synthesis is regarded as a liberal Islam in which a Turkish Islamic sensibility coexists with a tolerant, Western-friendly pluralism. 45 Apart from the discussions on the coming of an Islamist hegemony or liberal Islam, it is better to concentrate on the different dimensions of the post-Islamist triumph under JDP administration. Derived from the idea of an interaction between Kemalism and Islamism, it is possible to discover the dynamics of the shifting relationship between the Turkish Islamic actors and the secular state, from confrontation to cooperation, and how Islamic actors and the Kemalist state have transformed each other in the last two decades. 46 However, this is not the whole picture. The literature of transformation overemphasizes the transformative aspects of the political change that Islamists have experienced since the 28 February Process by focusing both on the significance of the learning process and on the structures for opportunity. This literature fails to recognize the impoverishing aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon an Islamist agenda.
My aim in this paper is to clarify that Turkish Islamism has been made defective by the loss of an Islamic political vocabulary and the Islamic way of life has been impoverished due to the perverse securitization of Islam by Kemalism at various times. 47 Unlike the Young Ottomans or Islamists in different parts of the contemporary Muslim world, Islamist (or ex-Islamist) politicians cannot use Islamic political concepts such as shura, biat, sharia and ummah in order to justify their democratic vision and experience. Islamists in Turkey are not legitimizing their transformation in terms of an Islamic vocabulary. Islamists have not been able to establish an Islamic discourse of transformation which would encompass different political positions on identity issues, ranging from those of leftists to those of the Kurdish nationalists. An interesting observation in this respect is voiced by an Islamist woman writer, Fatma K. Barbarosog lu. She emphasizes the maladies of the so-called 'transformation' in the Islamist discourses:
That pious people are forced to translate their religious stipulations and terminology of rights and freedoms into secular codes accelerated the secularization of Islamic segments. The most obvious instance of this came up with the headscarf ban. I am talking about the fact that the headscarf is defended without hesitation as an issue of 'women's rights'.
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In the 1990s, Islamist intellectuals were more influential in creating a sense of Islamic authenticity and in presenting alternative Islamic formulas to both Kemalist modernization and Western liberal democracy. There was, for example, an Islamic model of pluralism called the 'multi-judiciary order' which was proposed on the basis of the Prophet Mohammad's Medina Document 49 and the Ottoman millet system. 50 However, in the 2000s, liberal writers and their discourses have become dominant in justifying the reform processes and policies of the JDP. In other words, it is not an Islamist discourse but a liberal discourse which seeks to legitimize the JDP government's policies with reference to the following concepts: Europeanization, civilianization and the consolidation of democracy. Although JDP leadership has declared its political identity as that of a conservative democracy, it has benefited much from liberal discourses on democracy, secularism and Kemalism, as expressed by leading Turkish liberal writers.
Islamists have often declared their demand to have a genuine liberal democratic regime in which religious freedoms would be fulfilled. They have left 48 their claim of being Islamist and discovered that they are just religious Muslims, since Islam is not an ideology. Islamist politicians as well as Islamist intellectuals do not want to be referred to as 'Islamist'. Ideas of social justice, the freedom of religious education and the freedom to wear the headscarf in universities are no longer justified by reference to Islamic principles. Islamist demands have been reduced mainly to being in support of Muslim women's quest for the wearing of the headscarf at universities and for greater freedom for religious education. More importantly, these Islamic demands are defended as democratic and liberal rights rather than as religious duties. Since the heavy burden of Islamic identity politics (the headscarf issue) seems to be placed on the shoulders of Islamist women, they will continue to be the main actors in the transformation of Islamist discourses. At the same time, however, it seems that their lifestyle will remain a subject of securitization in Turkish politics.
An illustrating example can be found in the transformation of the JDP's political discourses. The label of conservative democracy is a vague concept and for the time being it is not possible to say that there is a political adherence to this new political identity even in the ranks of the party organization. Ex-Islamist politicians of the JDP do not advance further interpretation of the concept of justice in order to establish a new Islamic identity, though they do use this concept in the name of the party. Justice, as the first word of the party's name, has two meanings: it signifies the party's claim to fight injustice worsened by the corruption within the Turkish system, as well as reminds us of the fact that as the most significant Islamic concept since medieval times, justice has been a key issue for Islamism. The JDP's usage of the term 'justice' does not go beyond being a symbolic value which signifies the cultural roots of the party. The JDP seems to be trapped between an inclination to express an adherence to some references (conservative values and justice) which are directly related to Islamist ontology and an acceptance of dropping the Islamic vocabulary in order to protect the Islamic sensitivities of society from the noxious effects of politicization and conflict. 51 Furthermore, Islamists have some difficulties in dealing with the challenge of finding a way to be religious in a secular post-industrial society. The realities of secular life force Islamists to move beyond the prescriptions of Islamic tradition and text. The hybridizations and negotiations between Islamic imperatives and the practices of secular life give rise to new Muslim subjectivities. 52 Nevertheless, it is still ambiguous what kind of collective Islamic identity, if any, will arise from these subjectivities to signify a difference from the identity of those who are secular. The troubles of this self-reflexive transformation have not as yet been loudly spoken of in Islamist circles, since there are considerable benefits to being in power. Islamists have been experiencing power, enrichment, upward class mobilization and they have had successful careers during the period of the JDP government. Opportunity spaces have enlarged for Islamists; they have occupied the higher echelons of bureaucracy and they have become owners of large 51 Yasin Aktay argues that the transformation of Turkish Islamism in the case of the JDP represents not 'a failure of Islamism' but 'a further politicization' (daha yü ksek bir siyasallaşma), ' companies and media groups. The charismatic leadership of Erdog an and its popularity both in Turkey and in the broader Muslim world seems to discourage any further Islamist critique of the JDP's impact on Islamism. 53 The tensions between Kemalists and Islamists further conceal any internal discussions on the coming 'crisis of Islamic life' for the Islamist movement.
There is also a dilemma that some of both the Islamic electorate and the secularists share a belief that the JDP has not changed its political strategy to Islamize Turkish society. This situation blurs the extent to which the JDP has left its Islamic ideals. It also constitutes an effective barrier to any Islamist critique of the JDP government's policies over the religious demands of Islamist circles. The JDP, since 2002, has not been criticized adequately by Islamists, though it has not been able to fulfil Islamic demands on the headscarf and religious education. Undoubtedly, the Kemalist securitization provides enough material for excuses on the part of the JDP, which continues a politics of 'patience' (postponing Islamic demands until there is a broad consensus on religious demands). 54 The harsh criticism of the hard-liner Kemalists helps the party to postpone the religious demands of its constituency. However, this masks an impoverishment and the problems that are closely tied to the very heart of the transformation of Islamism in Turkey. The conundrum facing Islamists in the 2000s has been unnoticed largely due to this dilemma. For instance, Islamists are not discussing how to combine an Islamic ethos and vocabulary with secularism and with Turkey's integration within the EU. Due to the abovementioned impoverishment, one may argue that Turkey's experience of secularism, at least for the time being, cannot be a model for the rest of the Muslim world. However, it does give some inspiration to the different sectors of Muslims throughout the world. Perhaps Egypt's Muslim Brethren, rather than Turkey's JDP, might constitute a more suitable model for forward-looking Islamic movements.
Conclusion
Islamist movements have been transforming their discourses and programmes in many parts of the Muslim world over the last two decades and the Turkish case is no exception. The transformation of the Turkish Islamist movement has gained particular momentum under the influence of the growing demands of the Islamic middle class, the moderate positions of religious groups and other societal groups including labour unions and business associations. Islamists are rethinking their views on democracy and are focused, more than ever, on tolerance, pluralism, participatory aspects of democracy, civil society and a 54 There were of course some instances where Islamist intellectuals criticized the JDP for losing its willingness to transform the system and express its earlier Islamic sensitivities. The luxury lifestyle of the rising Islamic bourgeoisie is also the main subject in these critiques. Sezai Karakoç, Ahmet Taşgetiren, Hamza Tü rkmen, Fehmi Koru and Ali Bulaç are five examples of critical Islamists to be mentioned here. notion of living together. The JDP and the Gü len Movement, as the two leading actors of Turkish Islamism, benefit greatly from the opportunities that have opened up with the process of globalization and further integration with the EU.
Each individual case of Islamism should be interpreted within the parameters of its own genuine evolution and difference. Surely, the most striking characteristic of Turkish Islamism is related to the nature of the relationship between Kemalism and Islam since the foundation of the Republic. The underlying theme inherent in this relationship has often been a notion of securitization. Kemalism securitized the issue of Islam and established a firm control over religious life through the principle of secularism. In this sense, securitization has to be seen as a key to understanding the relationship between Islam and the state in Turkey.
The Kemalist experience of secularism and the specific characteristics of Turkish Islam, interacting with each other, have produced a more moderate course of Islamism and have prevented any radicalization of the Islamist movement even in times of repression. Kemalist securitization is a dynamic and complex process which has two different and interrelated aspects: the inclusion of Islamist actors and the exclusion of Islamist discourses. In establishing an official and acceptable form of Islam, by controlling the religious sphere, Kemalism in fact illegalized any autonomous existence of religious groups and excluded any Islamist discourse from the political arena. At the same time, it integrated Islamist actors into the system. In addition, it is here suggested that Kemalist securitization is a significant reason for the impoverishment of Islamist discourses. Securitization also conceals aspects of that impoverishment due to consumerism within Islamism. Indeed, the literature of transformation fails to recognize the impoverishing aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon the Islamist agenda.
Overall, Islamist politicians cannot use Islamic political concepts in order to justify their democratic vision and experience. They can hardly legitimize their transformation in terms of an Islamic vocabulary, which would encompass different political positions on identity issues, ranging from those of leftists to those of the Kurdish nationalists. In other words, Islamism in Turkey remains in metamorphosis, driven, on the one hand, by the demands of a new middle class and a new Islamic bourgeoisie for a pragmatic, open and moderate political identity (including lessons taken from the 28 February Process) and, on the other, by the loss of an Islamic ethos and vocabulary, which can be seen as manifestations of an impoverishment both for Islamists and for Turkish politics.
What is certain is that the transformation of Islamism in Turkey will contribute to the reconciliation of Islam and democracy and to the further consolidation of Turkish democracy if Islamic actors are allowed to frame their discourse in Islamic idioms. Then, Islamists will present a different synthesis of Islamic and secular vocabularies in order to define their own transformation and their projects on the future of the Turkish political system. To give an example, the JDP's adherence to an Anglo-American interpretation of secularism is not legitimized within the Islamic movement by reference to some religious concepts like ijtihad or the Constitution of Medina. However, this adherence still has to be embraced by the Islamic electorate of this party in order to be seen as more than a strategy to enlarge the political arena for religious freedoms. For otherwise, the securitizing nature of the Kemalist policies towards Islam will continue to The experience of Turkish Islamism 21 produce an impoverishment and further fears of a hidden agenda in Turkish polity. Islamists have to find their own solutions to these questions by developing their own vocabulary rather than looking for blueprints and the help of liberal secular intellectuals. They are under the burden of creating new syntheses that will combine Islamic vocabularies with the secular realities in a more global and European Turkey.
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